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Gender Discrimination and the Military Selective
Service Act: Would the MSSA Pass Constitutional
Muster Today?
In 1971, a group of men challenged the constitutionality of the
Military Selective Service Act ("MSSA7) on Fifth Amendment due
process grounds for subjecting males, but not females, to draft
registration.' A three-judge district court panel found that the MSSA
was unconstitutional. 2 In 1981, the Supreme Court held on appeal
that the MSSA did not violate the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution.3 The Court noted that the purpose of the MSSA was
to register potentially combat-ready troops. 4 Since women were
excluded from combat, the Court reasoned that they were not
similarly situated to men, and therefore, no equal protection
1. Rowland v. Tarr, 341 F. Supp. 339, 340 (E.D. Pa. 1972), vacated in part, a'd in
part, 480 F2d 545 (3d Cir. 1973), remanded sub. nom., Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F Supp. 586
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding MSSA unconstitutional), Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306 (1980)
(granting stay), rev'd, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). A class was later certified under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) consisting of all males "who are registered or subject to registration
under 50 U.S.C. app. s 453 or are liable for training and service in the armed forces of the
United States under 50 U.S.C. app. ss 454, 456(h), 467(c)." Goldberg, 509 F Supp. at 588-89
(E.D. Pa 1980).
The Third Circuit vacated the district court's ruling dismissing the issue of equal protection
as "nonjusticiable," remanding the case to a three-judge district court panel for determination
of whether the plaintiffs had "standing." Rowland v. Tarr, 480 F2d 545 (3d Cir. 1973).
"Standing" concerns whether the party has a legally sufficient interest to sustain a case.
BLAcKes LAW DIcToNARY 1405 (6th ed. 1990). "Justiciable" describes matters that are within a
court's proper jurisdiction. Id, at 865. On remand, the panel determined that the plaintiffs
had standing to bring the suit Rowland v. Tarr, 378 F Supp. 766, 768 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
Following this decision, the case lay dormant until 1979 when the Clerk of Courts for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania sought dismissal of the inactive case. Goldberg v. Tarr, 510
F Supp. 292, 294 & n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The parties then began to relitigate the case. Id. at
294.
2. Goldberg, 509 F Supp. at 605. The panel concluded that "the complete exclusion of
women from the pool of registrants does not serve 'important governmental objectives'
(citation omitted) and is not 'substantially related' (citation omitted), to any alleged
government interest." Id. The court decided that the "important government interest test"
was applicable in this case because the case involved a gender classification. Id. at 593.
3.
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). The Director of the Selective Service,
Bernard Rostker, appealed the district court's decision. Id. at 64. At this time, Justice
Brennan, sitting as a Third Circuit judge, stayed the order issued by the district court to stop
registration. Rostker, 448 U.S. at 1311.
4. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 77. The Supreme Court's reliance on the legislative history of the
MSSA in arriving at this conclusion is discussed later in this comment
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problem arose. 5
The roles that women play in the military, particularly in combat,
have changed substantially since the Supreme Court's decision in
1981.6 In addition, statutes and policies excluding women from
combat, upon which the Court relied in Rostker, have been
repealed or changed. 7 Given these changes, women are now more
similarly situated to men for purposes of the draft than they were
in 1981. This comment explores the changes in the status of
women in the military, specifically in regard to combat, and how
these changes may affect the Supreme Court's analysis of the
constitutionality of the MSSA today.
This comment does not challenge the correctness of the existing
combat exclusion, but analyzes whether the MSSA now violates
due process, in light of the intervening statutory and policy
changes. It is entirely possible that a present day challenge to the
MSSA would succeed on equal protection grounds.
BACKGROUND

The Military Selective Service Act
The MSSA was originally enacted on June 24, 1948.8 With minor
exceptions, the Act today is very similar to the 1948 version. 9 This
Act requires every male citizen and male resident of the United
States, between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, to register for
the draft at a time and place prescribed by the President.1 0 The
Selective Service System was originally designed to provide the
5. Id. The Supreme Court looked to statutory and policy reasons for combat
exclusion. Id. at 71-77. These reasons are discussed subsequently.
6. Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War and Military Culture, 45 Duxs L J.

651, 734 (1996).
7. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C.A. § 6015 (1959) (banning military women from serving on ships
in combat) (repealed 1993); 10 U.S.C.A. § 8549 (1959) (prohibiting women from roles as
combat pilots) (repealed 1991).
8. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch 625, 62 Stat 604 (codified, as amended, at 50
U.S.C. app. § 451 (1994)).
9. See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451, 453 entitled, "Historical and Statutory Notes" (1994).
10. The Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app., section 453(a) (1994), provides,
in part[I]t shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United States, and every other male
residing in the United States, who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any
subsequent registration, is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, to present
himself for and submit to registration at such time or times and place or places, and
in such manner, as shall be determined by proclamation of the President and by rules
and regulations prescribed hereunder.
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Department of Defense with a list of potential male combatants.
In 1975, President Gerald R. Ford suspended registration
procedures under the MSSA until new procedures could be
adopted. 2 President Jimmy Carter reinitiated registration in 1980,
under the Military Selective Service Act. 13 In doing so, President
Carter requested that Congress provide funding for the registration
of both males and females. 14 Congress, however, declined to
authorize funds to register females, allocating funds exclusively for
15
the registration of males.
Congress' decision revived the gender discrimination case of
Rowland v. Tarr,16 that had been languishing in the federal system
since 1971.17 Today, the MSSA still excludes women from
11.

LT. GEN. LEWIS B. HERSHE,

THE DRAm. A HANDBOOK OF FACTS AND ALTERNATVS;

CHAPE R 1: A FACT PAPER ON SuwrvE SERVICE, at 3, 4 (Sol Tax ed., Univ. of Chic. Press
1967). General Hershey was the Director of the Selective Service System at the time this
handbook was written. Id. He contends that the Selective Service System should be
distinguished from the "draft" Id. at 4. Although the Selective Service System provides the
Department of Defense with a list of potential soldiers, the Department of Defense, with few
exceptions, determines which registrants are chosen to serve in, or are drafted into, the
armed forces. Id.
12. Proclamation No. 4360, Fed. Reg. 14,567 (1975). The president's power to dictate
procedure concerning Selective Service registration stems from 50 U.S.C. app. section 453(b)
(1994).
13. Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Re& 45,247 (1980). President Carter reinitiated
registration procedures during the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, so that the United
States could "preserv[e] or enhanc[e] our national security interests.' Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57, 60 (1981).
14. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 60.
15. Id. Congress' decision to provide for the registration of males only was the result
of numerous hearings and debates. Id. at 72-73. Supporters of female registration included
the President, certain representatives of the Department of Defense and the Director of the
Selective Service. Goldberg, 509 F Supp. at 604.
16. 341 F Supp. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
17. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 61. In 1971, one male registered with the selective service and
three others not yet registered sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Rowland, 341 F Supp. at 340.
The plaintiffs contended that the MSSA was unconstitutional because it violated equal
protection by not treating men and women the same in regard to registration. Goldberg, 480
F2d at 547. A single district court judge dismissed the case as nonjusticiable. Rowland, 341
F Supp. at 341. The judge held that issues concerning Congress' constitutional power to
raise and support armies present political questions that, because of the separation of
powers doctrine, are beyond judicial review. Id.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the judgment,
remanding the case for consideration of the equal protection claim alone. Rowland, 480 F2d
at 547. The court of appeals stated that a three-judge district court panel is necessary when
"there is a challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute." Id, at 546. If the three-judge
panel determines that the plaintiff has standing, then the court may be requested to hear the
matter en banc. Id. at 547.
On remand, a three-judge panel held that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the
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registration, despite the many changes in the attitudes and roles of
women in the military. This comment addresses whether the
Supreme Court would hold the MSSA constitutional if faced with
the issue today.
Gender Discrimination
Whether the present MSSA is unconstitutional, as a violation of
the Fifth Amendment, must be considered in light of the Supreme
Court's treatment of a number of landmark gender discrimination
cases. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution prohibits any State from denying "any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."18 The Fifth
Amendment, applicable to the federal government, contains no
such equal protection clause.1 9 The Supreme Court, however, has
found equal protection implicit in the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. 20 Equal Protection does not require all persons,
21
but only those persons similarly situated, to be treated the same.
When the government treats one class of people differently than
another, the classification is subject to review under the Equal
Protection Clause.2 2 For example, in Reed v. Reed, an Idaho statute
was challenged on equal protection grounds for preferring
administration of a decedent's estate by a male, rather than a
female.23 The Supreme Court held that the gender classification was
MSSA- Rowland, 378 F Supp. at 768. The court also denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss. Id, at 772. This case did not resurface again until 1979, when a clerk of courts
sought to dismiss the inactive case. Goldberg, 510 F Supp. at 294 & n.9. The defendants
subsequently moved for judgment on the pleadings and a protective order precluding further
discovery by the plaintiffs. Id. at 294. The court treated the motion as a request for summary
judgment, denying the motion because it found the record incomplete. Id. at 297.
In 1980, a three-judge district court panel considered the case on the merits, holding that
the MSSA was unconstitutional and granting declaratory and injunctive relief to the plaintiffs.
Goldberg, 509 F Supp. at 605. In 1981, the United States Supreme Court stayed enforcement
of the district court's judgment. Rostker, 448 U.S. at 1311. Finally, in 1981, the Supreme Court
reviewed the case, holding the MSSA constitutional. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83.
18. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
19. Boiling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). In Bolling, black children were
segregated from other students in the District of Columbia school system. Id. at 498. The
minors claimed that this segregation violated their rights to due process of law. Id. The
district court dismissed the complaint Id. The plaintiffs appealed, but before the court of
appeals ruled on the matter, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id.
20. Id. at 499. The Bolling Court recognized that "equal protection of the laws is more
defined than "due process of law" and that the two "are [not] always interchangeable
phrases." Id.
21. Michael MLv. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981).
22. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
23. Id. at 71. The statute, in pertinent part, provided:
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unconstitutional because it was unrelated to the state's objective of

avoiding conflict between those seeking to administer an estate. 24
The Supreme Court has adopted various standards for testing
whether a classification violates equal protection. 25 For
classifications based on gender to survive an equal protection
challenge, the classification "must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
26
those objectives."
This standard was first enunciated in Craig v. Boren. 27 The
plaintiffs, in Craig, challenged an Oklahoma law prohibiting the
sale of 3.296 beer to males under the age of twenty-one, but
allowing the sale to females over the age of eighteen.28 The Craig
Court considered whether this gender classification was a violation
of equal protection of the laws. 29 Presumably, the Oklahoma statute
was designed to ensure "public health and safety."30 Without
Administration of the estate of a person dying intestate must be granted to some
one or more of the persons hereinafter mentioned, and they are respectively entitled
thereto in the following order.
1. The surviving husband or wife or some competent person whom he or she may
request to have appointed.
2. The children
3. The father or mother.
4. The brothers.
5. The sisters.
6. The grandchildren.
7. The next of kin entitled to share in the distribution of the estate.
8. Any of the kdndred.
9. The public administrator.
10. The creditors of such person at the time of death.
11. Any person legally competent. If the decedent was a member of a partnership at
the time of his decease, the surviving partner must in no case be appointed
administrator of his estate.
Id, at 72 n2.
24. Id. at 77. The state asserted that the reason for the order of preference in the
statute was to avoid conflict when more than one person was eligible to act as administrator.
Id. at 76. The statute relieved the trial court of the necessity of conducting a hearing to
determine which contender was best qualified. Id, The Court concluded that the preference
may not be made "solely on the basis of sex." Id. at 77.
25. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 497 n4. "Classification" is defined as an "[a]rrangement into
groups or categories on the basis of established criteria." BLAcK's LAW DicnoSArr 249 (6th ed.
1990).
26. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). This is referred to as the "intermediate
scrutiny" test Id.
27. Id. at 197.
28. Id at 192.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 199-200. The district court stated that this was the objective of the statute.
Id, The Supreme Court, however, upon examining the legislative history of the statute, found
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discussion or suggestion by Oklahoma, the Supreme Court
accepted this as an important governmental objective. 31 The Court
found, however, that the statute was not substantially related to
ensuring the public health and safety.32 Oklahoma presented the
Court with "statistical surveys" indicating that males between the
ages of eighteen and twenty were arrested more often for
alcohol-related offenses, were involved in more injurious and fatal
car accidents, and were more likely to drink and drive, than
females.33 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the statistics
were insufficient to establish a substantial relationship between the
classification and ensuring public health and safety.34 The statute
was, therefore, struck down as unconstitutional on equal protection
35
grounds.
In 1977, the Supreme Court upheld a Social Security Act
provision challenged on equal protection grounds.36 The Act
allowed a woman to subtract three of her lowest wage-earning
years from a calculation used to determine Social Security
benefits.3 As a result of this calculation, a woman received higher
benefits than a man with a similar wage-earning history.38 The
Court held that the stated objective of compensating female
that the legislature had expressed no clear intent or objective. Id.
31. Craig,429 U.S. at 199.
32. Id. at 200.
33. d. at 200-01.
34. Id. at 201. The Court reasoned that "proving broad propositions by statistics is a
dubious business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that
underlies the Equal Protection Clause.' Id at 204.
35. Id. at 210.
36. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977). The section of the Act challenged,
provides, in pertinent part:
(1) . . . [A]n individual's 'average monthly wage' shall be the quotient obtained by
dividing:
(A) the total of his wages paid in and self-employment income credited to his
'benefit computation years'. . . ,by
(B) the number of months in such years.
(2)(A) The number of an individual's 'benefit computation years' shall be equal to the
number of elapsed years... reduced by five...
(3)... the number of an individual's elapsed years is the number of calendar years
after 1950... and before
(a) in the case of a woman, the year in which she died or, if it occurred earlier but
after 1960, the year in which she attained age 62 ....
(c) in the case of a man who has not died, the year occurring after 1960, in which
he attained (or would attain) age 65.
I& 'at 315-16 n.1 (quoting Social Security Act of 1935, 64 Stat. 506, § 415(b) (1935), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 415 (b)(3) (1970 ed. and Supp.V)).
37. Id at 315-16.
38. Id.
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wage-earners for past wage discrimination was an "important
governmental objective" because the statute was designed to
remedy past discrimination.3 Since the classification was not based
on "archaic and overbroad generalizations about women, or of the
role-typing society has long imposed upon women," the Court
accepted the classification as a means of remedying the past
discrimination. 40 The Court also held that the classification was
substantially related to the government's objective, and therefore,
41
the statute was constitutional.
In 1981, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of a
criminal statute holding men, but not women, criminally liable for
"unlawful sexual intercourse."42 The Court found that the state has
an important interest in preventing teenage pregnancies, and thus,
may accommodate women for this "special problem."43 The statute
was also found to be substantially related to this interest because it
deterred activity resulting in teenage pregnancy.44 Since the state
had an important interest, and the statute was substantially related
to the achievement of that interest, the Supreme Court upheld the
statute as constitutional. 45
In 1982, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,4 the
Supreme Court struck down a policy excluding men from nursing
39. Id at 317-18. The Court reasoned that "the mere recitation of a benign
compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the
actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme." Id. at 317. The Court cited Sch/esinger v.
BaUard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), in support of this proposition. Id In Schlesinger, the Court
upheld a federal statute that required male naval officers to be discharged after nine years
without promotion. Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 513-14. Female officers, in contrast, were
discharged after thirteen years without promotion. Id, The Court found that male and female
naval officers were not similarly situated because of differences in career opportunities, and
therefore, were not constitutionally subject to the same standard. Id. at 508.
40. Webster, 430 U.S. at 317. The Court also ruled that Congress' amendment of the
statute in 1972, that treated men and women identically in the application of the benefit
calculation, did not indicate that Congress had unconstitutionally discriminated against men
when it originally enacted the statute. Id, at 320.
41. Id. at 318.
42. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 464. The California statute defined "unlawful sexual
intercourse" as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the
perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years." Id. at 466.
43. Id. at 469-70. The Court, in Michael M., concluded that "inquiries into
[Clongressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter.' Id. Further, the Court held that
it would accept a state's given reason for the classification if it could reasonably be
construed as satisfying a valid purpose. Id.
44. Id. at 473. The Court also noted that since females were the ones ultimately
harmed by teenage pregnancy, it was within the legislature's discretion to exclude them from
liability under the statute. Id.
45. Id. at 475.
46. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
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school because of their gender.47 The Court again applied an
intermediate scrutiny test to the gender classification. 48 Mississippi
cited past educational discrimination against women as a reason
for excluding men.49 The Court cautioned that remedial measures
for past discrimination are sufficient justification for present
discrimination only if the benefitted class actually suffered past
discrimination. 6° Mississippi, however, failed to show that women in
nursing had been discriminated against in the past.5 1 Therefore,
Mississippi failed to establish an important government interest.52
The Court also found that the classification was not substantially
related to remedying past discrimination against women.63 Because
the policy of excluding men failed to pass intermediate scrutiny,
the statute was struck down as unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds."
Finally, in United States v. Virginia,66 the Supreme Court held
that Virginia's policy of excluding women from the Virginia Military
Institute ("VMI) was unconstitutional because it violated equal
protection.6 The Supreme Court again employed the intermediate
scrutiny test.6 7 The Court, however, used the term "exceedingly
47. Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 733. Joe Hogan, notwithstanding his
gender, qualified for, but was refused, admission to the four-year baccalaureate program in
nursing at the Mississippi University for Women (JMUW"). Id, at 720-21.
48. Id, at 724.
49. Id. at 727. The Supreme Court noted that the state, in its reply brief, discarded its
argument that the school was created expressly to offer women an educational opportunity
not provided to men. Id. at 727 n.13.
50. Id. at 728.
51. Id. at 729.
52. Mississippi Univ. For Women, 458 U.S. at 729. The Court concluded that
Mississippi's policy *tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively
woman's job." Id.
53. Id. at 730. The Supreme Court stated that MUW's acceptance of men who wanted
to audit classes was not consistent with MUW's purported interest of compensating women
for past discrimination. I
54. It at 731.
55. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
56. Virginia, 116 S. CL at 2269. The Supreme Court also held that the creation of the
Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership ("WIL"), an exclusively female college, did not
remedy any equal protection violation caused by maintaining VMI as an exclusively male
college. Id. at 2285. The Court stated that VWIL was not "comparable" to VMI for numerous
reasons, and therefore, did not remedy the equal protection violation associated with the
exclusion of women from VMI. Id. at 2285-86. Furthermore, VWIL did not offer the military
training and experience that VMI offered, the same courses as VMI, the same athletic
program or facilities as VMI, nor the same advantages and prestige inherent in a VMI degree.
I& at 2283-85.
57. Id. at 2271, 2275. The Court reasoned that "the justification must be genuine, not
hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. The justification offered must not
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persuasive justification" interchangeably with the term "important
government interest."5 Virginia asserted that its exclusion of
women was motivated by its interest in furthering the "important
educational benefits" and diversity of an all male school.59 In
support of the gender classification, Virginia argued that if the
school were forced to admit women, the very character of the
school would have to change.6 The Court disagreed that VMI's
classification was intended to achieve diversity, because VM was
not created to offer equal opportunities for men and women, and
Virginia had only recently admitted women to other higher
educational institutions.6 1 The Court also disagreed that the
character of VMI would change if women were admitted because
some women would be able to meet the rigorous requirements of
the school.6 The Court cautioned that the State "may not exclude
qualified individuals based on 'fixed notions concerning the roles
and abilities of males and females.'"63 For these reasons, VMrs
exclusion of women was not related to VMI's asserted interest, and
therefore, the exclusion of women by VMI violated equal protection
64
of law.
Rostker v. Goldberg
By applying the intermediate scrutiny test in Rostker v.
Goldberg,66 the Supreme Court determined that the MSSA was
constitutional on equal protection grounds.r6 The Court recognized
that Congress had an "important governmental interest" "in raising
rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of
males and females." I&
58. Id.
59. Id at 2276.
60. Id.
61. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276-78. Virginia defined "diversity" as offering different
educational experiences to the public within the state of Virginia Id. at 2277. The Court
found that diversity may be a public concern, but that Virginia failed to show that VMI was
created with this purpose in mind. Id. Instead, the Court found that VMI was created in the
tradition of the University of Virginia, excluding women from its inception because Virginians
did not support higher education for women. Id, at 2277-78.
62. Id. at 2279. In support of this assertion, the Court noted that women have
succeeded at the federal military academies as well as n the military. Id. at 2281.
63. Id at 2280 (citation omitted). The Court also found that testimony in the district
court revealed that there were women who wanted to attend VMI and who were physically
capable of meeting all standards required of male cadets. Id. at 2279.
64. Id. at 2282.

65. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
66. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83.
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In this area Congress enjoys "broad

constitutional powers" to carry out these functions.6 The Supreme
Court noted that it must give a heightened deference to
Congressional decisions made pursuant to this enumerated power.6
In addition, the Court commented that the judiciary is not
competent to make judgments regarding military affairs, but
Congress, nevertheless, does not have unlimited power.7 0 Congress
must act consistently with the Due Process Clause of the
71
Constitution in exercising its power.
67. Id. at 70. Congress' power to raise, support, and regulate armies stems from
specifically enumerated powers in the United States Constitution. U.S. Const art. I, § 8, cls.
12-14. Section 8 provides, in part "The Congress shall have Power... [tlo raise and support
Armies ... [t]o provide and maintain a Navy-, [t]o make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces." Id.
68. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65.
69. Id. at 64, 65. There is a "customary deference" given to acts of Congress because
the legislative branch of government is the equal of the judicial branch. Id. at 64. The
Supreme Court concluded that the exercise of Congress' constitutionally-enumerated military
power deserved more than the "customary deference" afforded ordinary acts of Congress. Id.
at 64, 65.
70. Id. at 65-67.
71. Id, The Court cautioned that it must not "substitute our judgment of what is
desirable for that of Congress, or our own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation
by the Legislative Branch." Id. at 68. The Court also commented that it is not constitutionally
authorized to decide whether Congress made the right choice, but only if that choice violates
an individual's right to equal protection. Id. at 69.
The Supreme Court has upheld several legislative decisions regarding the military. In
Parker v. Lety, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice ("UCMJ"). Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). The Court noted that Congress
has "greater breadth and... greater flexibility when the statute governs military society.
• . .. Id., at 756. In Greer v. Spock, the Supreme Court upheld an Army regulation that
prohibited "speeches and demonstrations of a partisan political nature" on Army
installations. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 831 (1976). The Court noted that it was the
"business of a military installation... to train soldiers not to provide a public forum." Id. at
837. See also Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (soldiers under summary court-martial
not entitled to Fifth Amendment due process); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (Air
Force regulation prohibiting distribution of petitions on post did not violate the First
Amendment).
The Supreme Court has reviewed, and occasionally struck down, military-related law. For
example, in Frotiero v. Richardson, the Supreme Court invalidated a federal statute
concerning military benefits. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The statute
permitted a male service member to declare that his wife was his dependent for benefit
purposes, even if she was not actually financially dependent on him. Id. at 678. A female
service member, on the other hand, was required to prove that her husband was financially
dependent upon her in order to gain the same benefits. Id. The Supreme Court determined
that the only basis for the classification was gender. Id. As a result of this determination,
examination of the statute under a heightened standard of scrutiny was in order. Id. at 688.
The Court found that the Government's reason for different treatment ("administrative
convenience"), was unsupported by the facts. Id. at 688-89. The Court decided that men and
women service members with spouses were "similarly situated." Id at 690-91. Therefore, the
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Following its determination that the Congressional objectives
were important, the Rostker Court explored whether the MSSA was
substantially related to achieving the goal of raising and
maintaining the nation's armed forces.72 In holding that there was a
substantial relationship, the Court focused specifically on whether
males and females were similarly situated with respect to the
drafth3 The Court began its examination with the draft because the
legislative history of the MSSA indicated that the purpose of
registration was to provide the Department of Defense with a list
of potential combat troops in the event of a draft.74 In support of
this purpose, the Supreme Court cited Congress' reliance on
combat exclusions when determining whether women should be
registered under the MSSA.7h Women, by statute, were forbidden to
serve on Navy ships and Air Force planes involved in combat.7 6 The
Army and Marine Corps also maintained policies that excluded
women from participating in combat.77 In view of these combat
restrictions, the Court held that women were "not similarly situated
for purposes of a draft or registration for a draft."7 Since women
were not similarly situated, there was no justification for treating
them the same under the MSSA-7
Therefore, the gender
classification did not violate equal protection under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.so
ANALYSIS

Changes Since Rostker
Since the Supreme Court's decision in 1981, upholding the
constitutionality of the MSSA, there have been substantial changes
difference in treatment was discriminatory and violated due process. Id. at 690-91. See also
isupra note 39, at 498.

72. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 79.
73. 1& at 78.
74. Id. at 75. The Supreme Court reviewed congressional hearings and debates when
maling this determination. Id. at 76.
75. Id. at 77, 78 (citation omitted).
76. Id. at 77. Section 6015 of Ttle 10, United States Code, provides: 'women may not
be assigned to duty in aircraft that are engaged in combat missions nor may they be
assigned to duty on vessels of the Navy other than hospital ships and transports." 10 U.S.CA

§ 6015 (1959) (repealed 1993). Section 8549 of Title 10 provides: "[fiemale members of the
Air Force . . . may not be assigned to duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions." 10
U.S.C.A. § 8549 (1959) (repealed 1991).

77. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 76.
78.

Id. at 78.

79. Id. at 79.
80.

Id. at 78, 79.
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in the roles played by women in the military.8' In addition, statutes
and policies excluding women from combat, upon which the
Supreme Court relied in 1981, have been repealed and changed.8s In
light of these changes, the MSSA would probably not survive a
gender discrimination challenge today.
Intermediate scrutiny is still employed as the standard of review
for gender discrimination cases.8 s The outcome of applying the first
part of the test (that the classification serves an important
governmental interest) would remain the same as in Rostker.
Congress still has a constitutionally enumerated power to raise and
support armies.8 The gender classification constructed by the
MSSA would, therefore, serve the important governmental interest
of raising and supporting armies under the United States
Constitution.
The second prong of the intermediate scrutiny test (that the
classification must be substantially related to an important
governmental interest) would probably be decided differently today
than in 1981. The circumstances under which the MSSA was found
to be substantially related to raising and supporting armies in 1981
have changed significantly. The changes have made women more
similarly situated to men than they were in 1981. Therefore, women
are entitled to be treated the same as men, with respect to the
MSSA. Consequently, the gender classification in the MSSA is no
longer substantially related to raising and supporting armies.
Since 1981, statutes and policies regarding women in combat
have been repealed or changed. In 1991, Congress repealed a
statute forbidding women from serving as combat pilots in the Air
Force and Navy.85 In 1993, a statute restricting women from serving
on Navy ships involved in combat was repealed.86 In 1994,
Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, succeeded in having the "risk rule"
7
replaced by the "Direct Ground Combat Rule" ("DGC Rule").8
81. Morris, supra note 6, at 734.
82. See supra note 7.
83. Virginia, 116 S. Ct at 2275.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14.
85. Morris, supra note 6, at 735. See supra note 76 for the applicable text of the
statute. See also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L
No. 102-190, § 531, 105 Stat. 1290, 1365 (1991).
86. Morris, supra note 6, at 735.
87. Id. The "risk rule" forbade women from participating in any noncombat position if
the likelihood of being exposed to "direct combat, hostile fire, or capture equaled or
exceeded those risks in the combat units they supported." Id at 734.
The "Direct Ground Combat" rule is narrower than the risk rule and forbids women from
participating in positions of "direct combat on the ground" which is defined as " engaging an

1997

Military Selective Service Act

Thus, women are currently eligible for more than 99% of Air Force
positions.88 As a result of the implementation of the DGC Rule and
the repeal of restrictive statutes, more than 94% of Navy
occupational specialties are open to women today.s9 In the Marine
Corps, 62% of all positions are open to women, an increase from
3396 in 1994.0 Finally, the Army has increased the percentage of
positions open to women from 61% in 1994 to 67% today.91 These
increases indicate that today, unlike in 1981, women can participate
in combat duties such as flying combat jets or attack helicoptersY2
Furthermore, unlike in 1981, women are now eligible to serve on
combat ships9
Although there are still combat restrictions for women under the
DGC Rule, the positions open to women, including combat
positions, have increased significantly.4 Women have become an
integral part of the Armed Forces, and are now eligible to work in
80% of the jobs in the military, including combat postings.9
In 1981, women were excluded all together from combat. 6 Today,
women are eligible for some combat positions.97 In 1981, Congress'
most important reason for excluding women from the MSSA was
the fact that women were excluded from combat.98 Today, the basis
for Congress' decision lacks the force that it had in 1981.
Also in 1981, Congress determined that volunteers could fill any
need for women in time of draft, so there was no need to register
and draft women. 9 Today, the number of women in the military, as
well as the positions available to them, has increased. As a result,
more women would be needed during a draft for military positions,
including combat positions. Due to these changes, the exclusion of
women from registration under the MSSA is no longer substantially
enemy on the ground . . . while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of
direct physical contact with the hostile force's personnel." Id. at 735.
88 Id. at 736.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 737.
91. Morris, supra note 6, at 737.
92. Elizabeth A- Palmer, Officers Say Women in Battle Won't Change Standards, 51
CONG. Q. WxLy. REP., No. 20 at 1245 (1993).
93. Morris, supra, note 6, at 734.

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 77.
97. Morris, supra note 6, at 734-35.
98. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 78.
99. Id. at 81. See id. at 112 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall was joined in
dissent by Justice Brennan. The dissent argued that drafting women in numbers equal to the
military's need would pass constitutional muster. Id.
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related to the important governmental interest of raising and
supporting armies. As a result, the MSSA would most likely fail the
intermediate scrutiny test and be held unconstitutional as a
violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has not reexamined the constitutionality of
the MSSA since 1981. In the intervening years, Congress and the
military have amended the statutes and policies relied upon by the
Court in formulating its earlier decision. Women are now more
similarly situated to men than they were in 1981 in regard to
combat. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "[in
determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we
have never been confined to historic notions of equality, any more
than we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what
was at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental
rights."'00 The Court has also stated that "[n]otions of what
constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause do change. 1°1 With all this in mind, the next time the MSSA
is challenged on equal protection grounds, the challenger may well
succeed.
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